Oct 14th 2010 | MANAMA
ALMOST every day since mid-August, the Bahraini authorities have sent out batches of workers with paint-rollers to blot out, with grey smudges, the graffiti that have covered virtually every wall in the main streets of several of the drab Shia Muslim villages half an hour’s drive from the gleaming skyscrapers of the capital, Manama. In bright shades of red, blue and green, the slogans demand, among other things, “Power to parliament!”, “Give us back our human rights!”, “Free the prisoners!” and—most provocatively—“Down with the al-Khalifa!”, the royal family that has run the place since the British handed over power in 1971.
Oct 14th 2010 | MANAMA
ALMOST every day since mid-August, the Bahraini authorities have sent out batches of workers with paint-rollers to blot out, with grey smudges, the graffiti that have covered virtually every wall in the main streets of several of the drab Shia Muslim villages half an hour’s drive from the gleaming skyscrapers of the capital, Manama. In bright shades of red, blue and green, the slogans demand, among other things, “Power to parliament!”, “Give us back our human rights!”, “Free the prisoners!” and—most provocatively—“Down with the al-Khalifa!”, the royal family that has run the place since the British handed over power in 1971. The streets are also spattered with patches of black, where protesters have been burning tyres. According to the justice minister, more than a dozen Molotov cocktails were thrown at the police on the day the protests began.
No one has been killed in the unrest (which the police have damped down), but hundreds of young men have been arrested, along with 23 more prominent figures, including at least four Shia clerics, and the island’s cheekiest blogger, all said by the government to have spread false information, incited violence, fomented terrorism or plotted the government’s overthrow.
The mood became ugly largely because of the election due on October 23rd. There are 318,000 registered Bahraini voters, in a population of just over 1m people, around half of them deemed to be citizens. This will be the third general election since parliament was reinstated, after a 27-year gap, by a new constitution in 2002. Rising sectarian tension, the government’s overreaction to the protests and the blatant harassment of opposition parties, particularly the main Shia-dominated one, are all tarnishing Bahrain’s reputation as a fledgling if limited democracy.
Bahrain, one of six countries in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), where Saudi Arabia is pre-eminent, is the odd man out: although its ruling royal family is Sunni, like those elsewhere on the Arab side of the Gulf, the majority of its citizens, perhaps 60-70%, are Shia. If Bahrain had an unfettered democracy, the mainly Shia Wefaq party, which already has 16 seats (plus a supportive independent) in the 40-seat lower house of parliament, would probably rule the roost. Last time round it reckons to have won over 60% of the votes cast but was denied a majority in part because constituencies are gerrymandered to boost Sunni representation.
This time Wefaq’s leaders are being assailed in the pro-government press with accusations of encouraging terrorism and being in the pocket of “outside powers”, meaning in essence Iran. The foreign minister has publicly declared that he does not hold the Iranian government to blame, but conversations with Bahrainis aligned with the government are replete with such insinuations. When an Iranian parliamentarian mentions nostalgically that Bahrain was once a Persian province, a wave of Sunni suspicion erupts.
Indeed, blaming foreigners is standard practice whenever a ripple of disharmony laps the island monarchy’s shore. When a minor British Liberal Democrat peer, Lord Avebury, who has no role in government, hosted a small gathering of Bahraini political exiles in a committee room of the House of Lords, the Bahraini press was awash with allegations of a plot. After the present British ambassador to Bahrain met officials from Wefaq earlier this year, 200-plus Bahrainis, mainly Sunnis, signed a letter calling for his expulsion.
For their part, Western diplomats and human-rights campaigners bemoan what they see as an overreaction by the government. “There is not a shred of evidence” that the legal opposition has been planning or perpetrating terrorism, says one. Their fear is that milder-minded Sunnis and Shias will be pushed to extremes, risking the island’s destabilisation. In particular, independent outsiders reckon that reports of torture of many of those arrested are credible—and likely to deepen sectarian divisions. Bahrain’s own human-rights groups face increasing harassment, fines and travel bans, plus repeated accusations of encouraging terrorism.
Among the methods of torture most widely reported are hanging a victim by his wrists and in a so-called “chicken position”. Scores of young men are said to have been kidnapped and held incommunicado for days by the paramilitary National Guard, beaten up and then dumped, alive, without formal explanation. A report in February by Human Rights Watch, a New York-based lobby, suggested that such abuses were on the increase.
Wefaq does not, in any event, demand the immediate advent of full democracy. Nor, despite assertions by government figures, does it want a theocracy à la Iran, though its leader is loth to criticise the present rulers in Tehran. (Many Bahraini Shias prefer to look for inspiration to Ali al-Sistani, still Iraq’s most revered Shia ayatollah; some revere Lebanon’s late Sheikh Muhammad Fadlallah.) Wefaq’s main call is for the lower house of parliament to enjoy greater powers than the upper house, which is entirely appointed by the king, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa. The upper house has often overruled the lower one in the past four years, while the pace of modernising legislation has slowed down.
Wefaq especially wants the prime minister, Prince Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, the king’s uncle, who has held the post since 1971, to be publicly called to account before parliament and removed. It rails against corruption, especially over the distribution of land, which has enriched members of the Khalifa family and their friends. Wefaq also wants to end discrimination against Shias in the civil service.
Royal ringmasters
For its part, the Khalifa family, which has more than half the posts in cabinet, presents itself, in the words of the justice minister, Khalid bin Ali al-Khalifa, as “a buffer zone” between Sunni and Shia. Much is made of Bahrain’s position as a would-be democracy buffeted between the three regional giants, “a confessional democracy (ie, Iraq), a theocracy (Iran) and an absolute monarchy (Saudi Arabia).” Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, says the justice minister, fears have risen as Bahrainis have “taken refuge” in their sectarian identities. A firmer guiding hand is needed at the centre. The kingdom’s three key figures—the king himself, his uncle the prime minister, a master of patronage, and his son the crown prince, a pragmatic moderniser—are all thought to support a crackdown.
In the short term it might work. Opposition and human-rights people could be frightened into acquiescence. A royal pardon for the prisoners may be forthcoming once the post-electoral dust has settled. Bahrain may return to its habitual role as a perky financial hub that weathered the global crisis a lot better than some others in the Gulf.
Many Bahraini Shias are rich and successful. Indeed, the island’s Shias as a whole may well endorse Khalifa rule, provided they are given a greater say in running the island and a fairer share of jobs. But the government’s mishandling of events in the past few weeks has stirred a well of resentment that may, in the longer term, spell danger for the Sunni ascendancy—and even for the ruling house.