The country must address political instability fairly and decisively for assured economic growth
* By Joseph A. Kechichian, Special to Gulf News
* Published: 00:00 September 2, 2010
Although Moody’s Investor Services’ decision to downgrade the credit rating of Bahrain one notch was tied to deteriorating government finances, the island kingdom faced serious national security challenges that, left unattended, threatened to significantly erode its regional role. Ongoing riots, which resulted in arrests and injuries, do not bode well. Beyond urgent calls to restore a semblance of order, what are the consequences of these clashes?
The country must address political instability fairly and decisively for assured economic growth
* By Joseph A. Kechichian, Special to Gulf News
* Published: 00:00 September 2, 2010
Although Moody’s Investor Services’ decision to downgrade the credit rating of Bahrain one notch was tied to deteriorating government finances, the island kingdom faced serious national security challenges that, left unattended, threatened to significantly erode its regional role. Ongoing riots, which resulted in arrests and injuries, do not bode well. Beyond urgent calls to restore a semblance of order, what are the consequences of these clashes?
Notwithstanding a terrific socio-economic boom after the 1960s, Bahrain confronted political unrest before independence in 1971. Under the late Shaikh Eisa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, the government introduced several changes, which meant that the regime successfully managed its troubled relations with rising new forces — the political opposition, labour unions, students, and underground political parties. What united everyone was the quest for popular participation as parliamentary elections in 1972 ushered in a new constitution a year later.
Turning point
The parliament was short-lived as assembly debates plunged into chaos until October 1974, and workers initiated major riots, which prompted the ruler to coral a special “law on state security”. That measure sanctioned the government to “arrest and imprison any citizen without investigation or trial for a term of up to three years on suspicion of ‘opposing’ the government’s domestic or foreign policy.”
Parliament was dissolved in 1975 and Manama tightened the internal security noose around the opposition’s neck, as the region was enflamed in the Iran-Iraq War, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the January 1991 US-led UN-sanctioned war to liberate the shaikhdom, and the two wars for Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).
The Kuwaiti liberation, more than any other development, galvanised many Bahrainis to press for similar political rights. Though Shaikh Eisa wished, and worked hard, to reintroduce democratisation, others in the ruling family remained cautious, which led to fresh clashes in 1994.
When Shaikh Hamad Bin Eisa Al Khalifa [present King] acceded to rulership, many were surprised by his desire to finally institutionalise serious reforms. He granted amnesty to exiled opposition figures, and ended the despised and much feared state of emergency. Overall, his initiatives relaxed existing tensions among a wary population, eager to voice its opinion and participate in nation-building. In 2001, Shaikh Hamad called for the adoption of a new National Charter, followed by significant revisions to the 1973 constitution two years later, both of which dramatically altered Bahraini civil society. These were followed by a dramatic transformation of the shaikhdom into a kingdom in 2002, as exiled opposition figures were authorised to return home and assume public responsibilities. King Hamad even distanced his rule from the notorious security services under Ian Henderson, repealed offensive and largely ineffective emergency laws, and replaced them with more liberal laws that were perceived to be legitimate.
Still, these spectacular changes did not bring what most Bahrainis sought: democratisation. Although municipal elections were held in 2002, the new Majlis Al Nuwab was carefully neutralised by a Majlis Al Shura, an appointed Upper House that acted as the intrinsic balancer on the power of the democratically elected Lower House. Needless to say, such manoeuvres created a constitutional Catch-22.
What Manama was left with was a semi-representative system and while the King was more adroit than his predecessor, he cloaked his initiatives under the veil of referenda, without addressing core concerns. The Shiite Islamist opposition resisted these political conditions.
Consequently, it was critical to evaluate the wave of recent violence within this long legacy. It was facile to blame outsiders (read Iran) for the country’s intrinsic problems, but the King’s government recognises, and accepts, that every Bahraini was entitled to participate in the country’s future, no matter their political preferences.
While the government has every right to ensure law and order, accusations that Bahrainis who disagreed with it were engaged in “seditious acts” that destabilised security and stability, were sometimes overblown. Vandalism, arson and targeting of public properties and other criminal activities by “citizens” of any country must be handled according to the law. Those arrested ought to be tried. Yet, such acts cannot defame a nation’s image, and though one might conclude that they may be misguided, those who oppose a regime assume responsibilities too and must bear the consequences for violent behaviour.
Bahrain’s two-pronged challenges, therefore, were its economic doldrums and suspended political life. With limited oil revenues and significant budget deficits, one wonders whether the International Monetary Fund forecast, which placed its growth rate at an estimated 4.6 per cent for 2010, may be optimistic. Moreover, the government surely understands that economic progress will require political stability, which means that sectarian tensions between Shiites and Sunnis may impact the parliamentary and municipal elections, scheduled for October 2010.
Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.