Having Election Observation without Guaranteeing Independence and Efficiency is to the Detriment of the Neutrality and Credibility
Depending on Government Support or Funding will Increase the Government’s Ability to Penetrate the Human Rights Organizations
Receiving Funding from the Executive power is an International Standard for the Lack of Independence of the Non-government Associations
24 June 2010
The Bahrain Center for Human Rights is following up in wonder and concern the request of two Bahraini associations – who are expected to be the only two authorized associations to observe the upcoming elections – to receive government funding to carry out election observation[1]. The BCHR fears that this – intentionally or not – would give the Authority more dominance over election observation, and which on the other hand would increase its ability to manipulate the elections and its results, and to mislead internal and foreign public opinion.
Having Election Observation without Guaranteeing Independence and Efficiency is to the Detriment of the Neutrality and Credibility
Depending on Government Support or Funding will Increase the Government’s Ability to Penetrate the Human Rights Organizations
Receiving Funding from the Executive power is an International Standard for the Lack of Independence of the Non-government Associations
24 June 2010
The Bahrain Center for Human Rights is following up in wonder and concern the request of two Bahraini associations – who are expected to be the only two authorized associations to observe the upcoming elections – to receive government funding to carry out election observation[1]. The BCHR fears that this – intentionally or not – would give the Authority more dominance over election observation, and which on the other hand would increase its ability to manipulate the elections and its results, and to mislead internal and foreign public opinion.
It has been proved, from previous experiences in 2002 and 2006, that the government had made use of its power in manipulating the election process in dividing the electorates, and by using the general ballot boxes and the political naturalization and army, and the direct interference in supporting some candidates who are adherent to the Authority or overthrowing it opponents. At a time where the Authority prohibited any external or internal institute to observe the elections, it limited it to two associations, which are the same two associations that are currently requesting the support of Authority to observe the upcoming elections. Despite all that was raised regarding the government’s manipulation in the last elections, the outcome of the final report of these two associations in the elections of 2006 was in the interest of the Authority, which raised a lot of babel and criticism, especially from the Authority’s opponents, which could demonstrate a failure of performance or being influenced by the Authority’s power or pressures.
In addition, it has been proved from the experiences of the last years that the Authority in Bahrain uses various methods to penetrate the non-government human rights organizations and to influence their decisions. These experiences have proven that the human rights organizations are vulnerable to government penetration and influence, and that depending on any government support or funding will increase the government’s ability to penetrate and influence.
Note that the international organizations consider that if any non-government organization receives funding, openly or secretly, from the Executive Authority it is an indication of the lack of independency of that organization, and this does not apply to the funding the State allocates for the civil society associations away from the dominance and power of the Executive Authority.
Any institute that intends to take on observing the elections should not do so unless it has secured the bare minimum of the basic requirements, and among them:
§ Enjoying independence; where it does not receive funding or any influence on its work and decisions by the government or any other political institute with a direct interest in the electoral process.
§ Having human and organizational potential and efficiency to cover the electoral process, geographically and time-wise, otherwise it should not give comprehensive conclusions and should only limit it to the observations it has obtained by the partial field monitoring in terms of quality and quantity, and that it should demonstrate that limitation in its final report.
§ The final report should not be limited to the voting and the results of the vote counting, yet it should include all the effects of the electoral process and to assess if it has in fact achieved the political rights of citizens, and if it was far from discrimination, and if it was unbiased, and if its system is compatible with the international standards, and if the fundamental liberties, such as the freedom of expression, press and organization is widely provided for both in terms of legislation or in practice.
§ That no institute, which has been permitted to observe the elections, should accept to be a substitute for international observation which usually has the benefit of greater capabilities, experience and independence. Also, that its report includes an assessment of the Authority’s policy towards the international and local observers.
The BCHR encourages that the election observation mostly should be built on voluntary work accompanied with good training, and it has been proved from the experiences of other countries, that the volunteers are more committed and accurate than those who do so for financial benefits. The policy of depending – as much as possible – on volunteer work also benefits reducing the dependence on funding from any source.
The BCHR emphasizes that in case any institute insists on observing the elections without guaranteeing independence and efficiency, this will make that institute liable to become part of the Executive Authority and its plot, instead of being an impartial and credible observing institute.
[1]Alwasat newspaper