The Smart-Card in Bahrain:A Move Towards Greater Surveillance Rather Than Greater Rights

The Smart-Card in Bahrain:

A Move Towards Greater Surveillance Rather Than Greater Rights
Monitoring And Targeting Of Opposition Figures And Human Rights Defenders
Bahrain Center for Human Rights – 10 July 2007
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy…” Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1. Introduction:
The Smart-Card in Bahrain:

A Move Towards Greater Surveillance Rather Than Greater Rights
Monitoring And Targeting Of Opposition Figures And Human Rights Defenders
Bahrain Center for Human Rights – 10 July 2007
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy…” Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1. Introduction:
The Bahrain government, through the widely discredited and mistrusted Central Informatics Organisation (CIO) is implementing measures to create a national database of personal and sensitive information about citizens, through a Smart Card programme.
Marketed as a ‘service’, the Smart Card contains a microchip carrying information from individuals’ drivers licenses, Citizen Population Registration (CPR) cards, passports, medical records, banking details, educational data, and a digital fingerprint.
According to CIO officials, citizens can use the cards to pay bills, for financial transactions, and to vote in municipal and parliamentary elections.
The information on the Smart Cards will be stored on a national database managed by the CIO.

2. Background on the CIO:
At the centre of the ‘Bandargate’ (Ref: 07022501) scandal of last year, the head of this organization Shaikh Ahmed bin Ateyatalla Al Khalifa has been accused by a former consultant to the Bahrain government of financing a secret web of officials, activists and other individuals working to manipulate the results of national elections, maintain sectarian distrust and division, and to ensure that Bahrain’s Shi’a citizens remain oppressed and disenfranchised.
As a result of leaking the information in a 216-page report containing cheques, receipts, letters, bank statements and accounts sheet, its author Dr. Salah Al Bandar (chancellor of strategic planning at the
Council of Ministers Affairs) was deported to the United Kingdom as he is a British citizen.
The CIO is also responsible for the widely opposed e-voting scheme which was scrapped prior to last November’s national elections following the incriminating revelations of the ‘Bandargate’ report.
3. The Smart-card – an international perspective:
“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”
(Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 8, Clause 1)
Campaigners in long-established and well developed democracies (such as the United Kingdom) have resisted the imposition of Smart Cards.
Key issues include the protection of individual’s privacy under human rights law against the potential use of unchecked executive powers, and the risk of forgery and identity theft.
According to International NGOs such as Privacy International (www.privacyinternational.org) ID cards can “invariably” be forged. The higher the value of cards (ie. the more sensitive information they contain) the greater potential for criminal activity with regards to them – they become a target for more sophisticated and organized criminal groups.
Another question raised in the UK is the British government’s technological capacity to manage and protect such a high security national database of information. The information stored in ID or
Smart Cards can be used by authorities or individuals other than those advertised as being in charge of the database.
In many countries, law enforcement and intelligence agencies have been given significant exemptions allowing the violation of individuals’ privacy.
The United States State Department’s Annual Review of Human Rights Violations counted 90 countries which illegally monitor communications of political opposition figures, human rights workers, journalists and union workers. (See Privacy and Human Rights, An International Survey
of Privacy Laws and Practice: http://www.gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.html)
Among Western democracies with a better record of transparency, checks on executive powers, and respect for human rights serious concerns have been raised about national ID or Smart Cards.
4. Concerns over the Smart Card in Bahrain:
It stands to reason then, that these same concerns are much higher in a country such as Bahrain where the government has a record of routine human rights abuses, unchecked exercise of executive powers, and the monitoring and targeting of opposition figures and human rights defenders.
As well as the sharing of sensitive personal information among government agencies, a significant concern is the Bahraini government’s technological capacity to protect such a high value database from hackers or criminals.
The distinct lack of legislation in Bahrain regarding data protection is another concern. Even if such legal protection did exist, given the Bahraini authorities’ record of violating human rights, it is
questionable as to how adequate such a law would be, and how well it would be enforced.
In March the BCHR received complaints regarding an alleged attempt by the Bahraini government to place a video monitoring device in the home of well-known women’s rights activist Ghada Jamsheer (Ref: 07031701).
Also in March, vice president of the BCHR Nabeel Rajab was called before the Criminal Investigation Directorate for interrogation. During the course of the interrogation, security officials produced printouts of Mr Rajab’s private email correspondence.
With such incidences of the violation of privacy by government officials and agencies it stands to reason that the implementation of a national Smart Card marks a move towards even greater surveillance of individuals rather than the greater freedoms promised by Bahrain’s ‘democratic’ developments.
Recommendations:
1. The BCHR calls for the national Smart Card programme to be scrapped. If it is to remain in place, it should not be under the auspices of the widely mistrusted CIO.
2. Smart Cards should be optional and not mandatory – citizens should be allowed to renew their traditional CPRs and driver’s licenses.
3. If the Smart Card scheme remains in place, data protection laws must be drawn up, implemented and respected by the authorities.
4. The government must be able to provide assurance from an independent party that its national database is technologically secure.
5. The Bahraini authorities must ensure that personal information stored in the national database will not be used by any agencies without the explicit consent of the individual.